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In this paper, we investigate international demand spillovers brought
about by a global middle class and their impact on trade patterns
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1 Introduction
Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) form the core of an emerging global
middle class. In this paper, we investigate how a global middle class may
influence trade flows of goods and services and the pattern of global pro-
duction. We focus on international demand spillovers which contribute to
expand production and achieve increasing returns to scale. Much as techni-
cal externalities propagate increasing returns across industries and national
borders, global demand spillovers may also generate such effects. There are
potential benefits to the world economy from the emergence of a large num-
ber of consumers whose tastes will change as their living standards catch up
with those in advanced nations. According to the World Bank, the emer-
gence of a global middle class will cause a major change in the demand for
goods, creating huge markets1. A new age of mass consumption is likely to
accompany the next wave of globalization.
Conversely, the emergence of BRIC countries on the international eco-
nomic scene poses a challenge to both advanced nations and smaller emerg-
ing countries. If China’s economic performance is in line with the Japanese
integration experience, the size of the former will have a particularly impor-
tant impact on the modernization or decline of industrial activities across
regions of the globe (see Winters and Yusuf 2007). Competition spans in-
creasingly diversified activities. The sheer size of these newcomers means
that these spillover effects may dwarf the comparison with either Japan or
South Korea.
On the one hand, trade theory traditionally concentrates on the supply
side. One standard assumption is that preferences are identical across trade
partners and homothetic, i.e., as income increases, consumption of each good
increases proportionately. As a result, demand-side effects are neutralized as
1Their last projections are eloquent (see Global Economic Prospects 2007, Chapter 3,
p. 69):
“In 2030, 16.1 percent of the world population will belong to what can be
called a ‘global middle class’ up from 7.6 percent in 2000. That is, in 2030
more than a billion people in developing countries will buy cars, engage in
international tourism, demand world-class products... Compare that with
only 400 million people in developing countries who had access to these
kinds of living standards in 2005... This large middle class will create rapidly
growing markets for international products and services...”
2
a determinant of the composition of trade. This is in contradiction to the
stylized facts. In reality, differences in purchasing power lead different goods
to be consumed (see, among others, Francois and Kaplan 1996 and Dalgin,
Mitra, and Trindade 2004).
On the other hand, there is a long tradition in development economics,
going back to the parable of the shoe factory by Rosentein-Rodan (1943),
that emphasizes how a positive sectoral shock may stimulate the develop-
ment of other sectors through market-size externalities linked to increasing
returns to scale. However, it was not until the end of the Eighties that
Rosentein-Rodan’s arguments describing economic development as a virtu-
ous circle driven by external economies, were formalized by Murphy et al.
in two companion papers (1989a,b). In the first paper, they model the so-
called ‘big push’ which produces industrial modernization as the outcome
of coordinated investments which propagate increasing returns across indus-
tries. In the second paper (henceforth MSV), pecuniary externalities work
via the buying power of the middle class to eventually determine the extent
of horizontal complementarity across all industries of the economy. In the
words of Matsuyama (1995, p. 703):
“... Suppose the [middle class] increases its demand for monop-
olistically competitive goods... Because prices exceed marginal
costs, such a shift in demand would increase the level of monopoly
profits in the economy and thus national income. This increased
income would generate additional demand for monopolistically
competitive goods, which further raises profits and income and
so on...”
This kind of argument which captures how ‘one thing leads to another’,
does not generalize directly to an integrated world economy. Our contri-
bution focuses on such a form of complementarity and allows domestic de-
mand to potentially spill over to any rival foreign industry, giving rise to a
global profit-multiplier process. In MSV, such a multiplier is limited to the
home market and determined only by the size of the domestic middle class.
We extend their closed-economy general equilibrium model to a two-country
framework where goods produced in both countries are substitutes and dif-
ferentiated by their country of origin. According to the relative size of the
domestic markets and the competitiveness of home and foreign rival firms,
each product may be produced domestically under internal increasing returns
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by a monopolist or by a competitive fringe under constant returns to scale.
Eventually, the magnitude and direction of international demand spillovers
determine the strength of increasing returns and as a result, the importance
of the cumulative processes in each country2.
The market size for each good depends on the number of agents that
can purchase it, which itself depends on the distribution of purchasing power
both across and within trade partners. Under free trade, the domestic middle
class is a relative notion which is not internationally comparable. A middle
class household in its own country may be rich enough to belong to the up-
per class of the world income distribution. Conversely, a household may be
rich by national standards but belong to the global middle class. In a closed
economy, all profits and wages distributed to the domestic middle class re-
turn as demand addressed to the home industries. By opening to trade, they
become a component of demand for either the home good or the substitute
produced abroad, depending on the level of international competitiveness.
This, in turn, affects real national incomes and welfare. Thus international
trade leads the global middle class purchasing power to interact with increas-
ing returns making them stronger or weaker depending upon asymmetries in
domestic income distribution, labor efficiency, and labor force size.
First, we show that export-competing industries in the unequal country
can take advantage of the larger middle class in the more egalitarian trade
partner, so that trade integration tends to equalize average income of trade
partners who differ only in their income distribution.
Secondly, when trade partners differ only in their labor efficiency, free
trade exacerbates international disparities in real average income and makes
increasing returns weaker in the technically backward country which might
be tempted to revert to autarky. This dampens the local market-size exter-
nalities’ argument by MSV and revives the argument for protection. The
intuition behind this pattern is easy to grasp. First, terms of trade must ad-
just to reflect labor efficiency differences, penalizing the ability of firms in the
lagging country to compete in the global market. Secondly, the top-middle
class of the lagging country becomes the bottom-middle class in the global
2Incidentally, MSV acknowledge that (p. 560): “This question gains particular signifi-
cance in the open economy, where foreign competition might reduce [industrial moderniza-
tion]... We have only focused on the income distribution as the determinant of market size.
One can also consider other important determinants of market size, such as population
size and average income, and ask various questions about industrialization in small versus
large countries, as well as in poor versus rich countries.”
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context. A large proportion of its consumers becomes a source of increasing
returns in the advanced country, boosting production in the area of goods
with lower income elasticities of demand. In the lagging country, the higher
advanced country’s middle class purchasing power benefits sectors producing
goods with relatively higher income elasticities of demand and mostly sub-
ject to constant returns to scale. Examples we have in mind concern the toy
industry in China and tourism.
Thirdly, we explore how worldwide demand complementarities influence
trade patterns and industrialization between countries differing only in the
size of their labor force. We show that trade integration favors the small
economy because international demand spillovers lead the large country’s
middle class buying power to strengthen increasing returns in the small trade
partner’s industries.
Finally, we investigate the consequences of a technically backward trade
partner narrowing its technological gap under the free trade regime, as well
as trade between a large emerging country and a smaller industrialized coun-
try. Technological catch-up yields a decline in export prices in the emerging
country’s firms which become relatively more competitive. A larger variety of
goods is produced under increasing returns because of the increased buying
power of the emerging global middle class, brought about by lower prices.
Eventually, demand complementarities propagate increasing returns across
national boundaries, so that the rise in average productivity in the emerging
country spills over to those industries in the advanced country which produce
goods with high income elasticities of demand.
To our knowledge, the papers most closely related to our study are those
by Matsuyama (2000) and Mitra and Trindade (2005). Matsuyama incor-
porates international demand complementarities in a Ricardian model à la
Dornbusch et al. (1977), i.e., with a continuum of industries. The assumed
pattern of comparative advantage leads the technological leader to completely
specialize in goods with higher income elasticities of demand, whereas the
developing country exports more basic goods. Matsuyama then discusses the
impact of market size and technology differences on trade flows. However, by
adopting a Ricardian framework, he considers neither international compe-
tition nor demand complementarities as a source of increasing returns. The
same limitation applies to Mitra and Trindade’s contribution. They adopt a
2× 2 Heckscher-Ohlin framework where trade partners are identical in every
respect except for their income distribution. With homothetic preferences,
this means that a move from autarky to free trade has no consequence on
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either trade partners. With non-homothetic preferences though, the more
unequal (equal) country has a higher demand for labor- (capital-) intensive
good which, by assumption, is characterized by a lower (higher) income elas-
ticity of demand. This yields ‘specialization in consumption, not production’.
One implication of increasing returns to scale for international trade is
the possibility of losses from trade for one country therefore justifying pro-
tection. This argument was introduced into the trade literature by Graham
(1923), and formalized by Ethier (1982) in a two-country (alike in every re-
spect except for size), two-sector model in which one is subject to increasing
returns and the other to constant returns to scale. Our paper is also re-
lated to that strand of the literature which deals with increasing returns and
gains from trade as covered by Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985). It examines the impact of demand for the goods produced under
increasing returns on gains from trade, by combining internal increasing re-
turns and trade in differentiated goods. Note first that this rules out perfect
competition and thus differs from Ethier’s setting which considers trade in
homogeneous goods and external increasing returns to scale. Secondly, in
contrast to the trade literature dealing with differentiated goods under mo-
nopolistic competition and the home market effect of Krugman (1980), there
will be no trade-off between increasing returns and the number of varieties
produced by the domestic industry. Our variable of interest is not the im-
plicit zero-profit number of firms in each industry, but the profits realized in
each industry. A larger market for a particular industry is not synonymous
with more firms, it rather yields higher profits which translate into a larger
multiplier.
Lastly, Hirschman’s (1958) concept of backward and forward linkages is
very much related to Rosentein-Rodan’s (1943) ideas in that it also involves
the interaction between market size and increasing returns to scale arising
from externalities. Until recently, their arguments suffered from a lack of
interest by the profession (see Krugman 1995). In this respect, it is worth
pointing out another line of research pioneered by Rodríguez-Clare (1996)
who offers a formal treatment in a two-country model of Hirschman’s linkages
by focusing on their generation by multinationals.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the world general equilibrium under free trade. Our main results
are derived in Section 4, where we analyze the impact of asymmetries in,
successively, (i) income inequality, (ii) labor efficiency, and (iii) labor force
size on the global industrial activity and trade patterns. Finally, in Section
6
5, we investigate the impact of a change in labor efficiency, extending our
analysis to free trade between an industrialized country and a larger emerging
country, e.g., US versus China. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our model is a two-country framework, 1 and 2, where subscripts i and
j are used as non specific references to 1 and 2 ({i, j} = {1, 2}). When
two subscripts are attached to a variable, the former identifies the country
of origin of the good while the latter denotes the country in which it is
consumed.
2.1 Preferences
Households are heterogeneous with respect to the utility they incur from
buying the domestic or foreign variety of a given good. We follow the ideal
product approach (see Lancaster 1979) and attach a value mi to each house-
hold which measures the utility from purchasing a good produced in country
i. It is assumed that m1 = m is a random variable from a uniform distribu-
tion on the interval (0, 1] and m2 = 1−m.
We define a utility function of a type-m household over an infinite con-
tinuous range of indivisible goods q ∈ (0,∞), by
V m =
∫ ∞
0
(1 + q)−σ
(
mδiX
q
i + (1−mi)
δXqj
)
dq, i, j = 1, 2 and i 	= j, (1)
whereXqi +X
q
j ≤ 1, and parameters δ, σ > 0. Each good q is differentiated
on the basis of the country of origin.
Let Xqi be an indicator function which takes the form
Xqi =
{
1 if the household buys country i’s variety of good q
0 otherwise
.
Our preference modelling has a number of implications. First, households
must choose their most preferred good or ‘ideal product’ out of each industry
q, where at most only two varieties (home and foreign) of each good q may be
available in the global market. A single household either buys home or foreign
goods but never a combination of the two. Secondly, there is satiability of
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preferences and a household’s utility increases with the range of goods (0, q)
it consumes and not with the consumption of a single good q. Thirdly, the
proportion of income that households spend on lower-indexed goods or on
goods with lower income elasticities of demand, decreases with a household’s
income. Hence, richer households can consume more than the bundle of
goods available to poorer households.
For a type-m household, the country i-product variety of good q is pre-
ferred if
mδi
pqi
>
mδj
pqj
⇔ mi >
(pqi )
1/δ
(pqi )
1/δ + (pqj)
1/δ
, i, j = 1, 2 and i 	= j, (2)
where pqi is the price of good q produced in country i. On the one hand,
suppose pqi > p
q
j and δ = 0, all households are better off by acquiring the
cheapest variety. On the other hand, if δ approaches infinity, the fraction
of households purchasing home goods equals one half, irrespective of their
price. Thus, δ measures the relative price sensitivity of demand.
2.2 Technology
Human capital is the only input in production and the stock of human capital
in country i is equal to hiLi, where Li is the size of the labor force and hi
is the average level of human capital. In each country, two technologies are
available to produce each variety of good. One technology is assumed to
exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS). It requires α/Ai units of human
capital, with α > 1, to produce one unit of good q. Ai acts as an index of
productivity of the labor force in country i and differs by a uniform amount
across trade partners, i.e., Ai(q)/Aj(q), i 	= j, is identical for all q. The
alternative technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale (IRS).
It requires 1/Ai units of human capital to produce one unit of good q plus a
fixed setup of F/Ai units of human capital. A firm switching from the CRS
to the IRS technology is used as a metaphor for industrial modernization.
All firms in each country may serve both their domestic and export market.
2.3 Income inequality and the budget constraint
Households also differ in terms of their income. Following MSV, we assume
that there is an exogenous nondegenerate distribution of assetsGj(γ) in coun-
try j with γ ∈ [γ
j
,∞) and γ
j
≥ 0, the minimum share of ownership. Within
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the present framework, γ
j
acts as a threshold which must be interpreted as
the poverty line above which one finds two categories of households, where
each household is a member by country j standards of either the middle or
the upper class.
We define a class γ of households’ income (yγj ) in country j as follows
yγj = γ(wjhjLj + πj), j = 1, 2, (3)
where πj denotes aggregate profits, wj is the wage per unit of human
capital, and γ is the extent of ownership of all profit-making firms located in
country j held by type-γ households.
For analytical convenience, Gj(γ) is assumed to be perfectly correlated
with the distribution of the human capital endowment and a type-γ house-
hold supplies γhjLj units of human capital inelastically. Let (0, q
γ) be the
bundle of goods purchased by the household with a share in the profits γ in
country j. Since there is preference satiability and goods are indivisible, its
budget constraint is given by∫ qγ
0
(∑
i
pqiX
q
i
)
dq = γ(wjhjLj + πj), j = 1, 2. (4)
3 International general equilibrium
3.1 Effective demand size and minimum efficient scale
We begin by restating the MSV’s price equilibrium strategy in a closed econ-
omy. Each good q may be produced either by a competitive fringe with the
CRS technology or by a monopolist with the IRS technology if demand is
high enough to cover fixed costs. When it is produced with the CRS tech-
nology, the free entry zero-profit condition ensures that the price is equal to
average cost, i.e., pqi = αwi/Ai. Suppose that in each sector in either country,
there is only one firm with access to IRS technology. MSV show that under a
plausible assumption on Gj(γ), the unique Nash equilibrium is for domestic
monopolists in some subset of sectors (0, q) to enter and to keep prices at
αwi/Ai. They neither cut prices, nor do they benefit from increasing them.
When there is no technology transfer and countries trade freely, we show
that the Nash equilibrium price strategy for monopolists in countries 1 and 2
entering the global marketplace is also to keep prices at respectively αw1/A1
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and αw2/A2. A sufficient condition is that the world distribution of real
income be sufficiently smooth, i.e., ‘without large peaks or discrete spikes’
(see Appendix for details). A key implication for our model is that trade
between countries of different size and/or factor efficiency can be closely
related to a standard world price equilibrium along the lines of a Ricardian
model.
As long as Li > F/(α − 1), we have the following break-even condition:
A good q is produced in country i with the IRS technology if the demand for
that good (Dqi ) satisfies
(α− 1)wi
Ai
Dqi −
Fwi
Ai
≥ 0⇔ Dqi ≥
F
α− 1
, i = 1, 2, (5)
with the minimum efficient scale defined by D∗i = F/(α− 1).
Let q∗i denote the good produced at that minimum efficient scale in coun-
try i. Then, industries which produce lower- (higher-) indexed goods use
IRS (CRS) technologies. Thus, q∗i measures the variety of goods produced
using IRS in country i. We define γ∗ij as the share ownership of the marginal
household living in country j and whose purchasing power allows it to buy
(0, q∗i ):
q∗i =
γ∗ij(wjhjLj + πj)
pi
=
Aj
α
pj
pi
γ∗ij
(
hjLj +
πj
wj
)
, i, j = 1, 2. (6)
Country 1’s labor force can be divided into: (i) households which have
enough buying power to purchase all goods produced under IRS in country 1
(0, q∗1) plus some higher-indexed goods which are produced under CRS, i.e.,
γ ≥ γ∗11, and (ii) poorer households which cannot acquire such a range of
goods, i.e., γ
1
≤ γ < γ∗11. Country 1’s labor force can also be divided into:
(iii) households which are rich enough to buy all goods produced under IRS
in country 2 (0, q∗2) plus some higher-indexed goods which are produced with
the CRS technology, i.e., γ ≥ γ∗21, and (iv) poorer households which cannot
acquire such a range of goods, i.e., γ
1
≤ γ < γ∗21. The global middle class by
the standards of country i brings together households of type γ
j
≤ γ < γ∗ij,
i, j = 1, 2.
We define the global upper class by country i standards with
N∗ij = (1−Gj(γ
∗
ij))Lj, i, j = 1, 2. (7)
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Finally, in equilibrium, one household of typem consumes either domestic
or foreign goods (but never a combination of the two). Given Eq. (2), the
proportion of households in the world which consume country i-products is
λi = 1− λj =
p
1/δ
j
p
1/δ
i + p
1/δ
j
⇔
pi
pj
=
(
1− λi
λi
)δ
, i, j = 1, 2 and i 	= j, (8)
where 1 − λi is also the proportion of income in country i spent on im-
ported products. Consequently, the width of the market for the producer of
q∗i (D
∗
i ) depends on both the terms of trade and the size of the global upper
class by country i standards. It is given by
D∗i = λi
[∑
j
(1−Gj(γ
∗
ij))Lj
]
=
F
α− 1
, i = 1, 2. (9)
Note that all households characterized by γ∗ij are able to consume exactly
q∗i ; they have similar purchasing power in terms of goods produced in country
i. Thus, a household of type γ in country j may be rich enough in its
own country to belong to the domestic upper class although from a global
perspective it belongs to the world middle class.
3.2 Trade balance and the global profit-multiplier
The aggregate profit function in country i is the sum of profits in all industries
q ∈ (0, q∗i ):
πi = (α− 1)
wi
Ai
∫ q∗i
0
Dqi dq −
∫ q∗i
0
wi
F
α
dq, i = 1, 2,
with the demand for good q produced in country i defined by
Dqi =
∑
j
Dqij = λi
∑
j
(1−Gj(γ
q
ij))Lj, i = 1, 2, (10)
and where γqij = piq/(wjhjLj + πj) is the share ownership of the poorest
household in country j which can purchase (0, q).
Using Eqs. (6) and (7), the above expression for profits can be integrated
by change of variable and then by parts to yield
πi
pi
=
α− 1
α
λi
[∑
j
Tij(wjhjLj + πj)
pi
]
, i = 1, 2, (11)
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with Tij = Lj
∫ γ∗ij
γ
j
γdGj(γ) denoting the share of income held by this
middle class living in country j which could potentially contribute to increase
profits made by industries in country i. Thus, country i profits depend on
middle class real income in both trade partners expressed in terms of the
price of country i-products, Tij(wjhjLj + πj)/pi, and the proportion of the
global middle class which consumes i-products (λi) multiplied by the markup
(α − 1)/α. In the open economy, the combination of a large global middle
class and price competitiveness sets the conditions for a relatively aﬄuent
consumer economy.
Our model ignores international borrowing and lending. Therefore, bal-
anced trade requires
pi
∫ ∞
0
Dqijdq = pj
∫ ∞
0
Dqjidq ⇔ λi(wjhjLj+πj) = λj(wihiLi+πi), i, j = 1, 2 and i 	= j.
(12)
Expenditure on goods produced in country i by households living in coun-
try j (left-hand side) equals expenditure on goods produced in country i by
households living in country j (right-hand side). Because of Walras’ Law, the
clearing condition in Eq. (12) also ensures equality of demand and supply of
labor within each trade partner.
Substituting the balanced trade condition (12) into the profit expression
(11) yields profits per wage unit
πi
wi
=
α−1
α
hiLi
[∑
j λjTij
]
1− α−1
α
[∑
j λjTij
] , i = 1, 2, (13)
where the global profit-multiplier (Mi) is defined to be 1/(1−
α−1
α
[
∑
j λjTij]).
3.3 Trade equilibrium
We first combine the balanced trade condition in Eq. (12) and the definition
of q∗i as provided by Eq. (6). This yields the following relationship linking
the shares of industrial profits in the hands of home and foreign marginal
households with similar real income in terms of goods produced in country
i:
γ∗ii =
1− λi
λi
γ∗ij, i = 1, 2 and i 	= j. (14)
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Secondly, we use Eqs. (8) and (13) to rewrite the market clearing condi-
tion (12) as follows
Â1
Â2
=
M2
M1
L2
L1
(
λ1
1− λ1
)1+δ
, (15)
where Âi = Aihi measures labor efficiency in country i. The trade equi-
librium values of γ∗11, γ
∗
12, γ
∗
22, γ
∗
21, and λ1 = 1−λ2 are determined by solving
jointly Eqs. (9), (14), and (15). Let Gj(γ) be the Pareto income distribution
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in country j. We are now in a position to show how international differences
in income distribution, labor efficiency, or labor force size may produce either
gains or losses from trade. Indeed, substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (9) allows
us to express γ∗ii as an implicit function of λ1. The right-hand side of Eq.
(15) can then be expressed as a one-variable function Ψ(λ1) which can be
shown to be strictly increasing as long as δ > α− 2, ensuring that the trade
equilibrium is unique under relatively mild conditions.
3.4 Average income, industrialization, and welfare
In autarky, all profits that are distributed to the domestic middle class return
as demand addressed to the home sectors. This implies the closed economy
profit-multiplier Mi = 1/(1 −
α−1
α
Ti) in country i with Ti = Li
∫ γ∗i
γ
i
γdGi(γ)
and γ∗i the marginal household by country i standards such that the break-
even condition F/(α− 1) = N∗i = (1−Gi(γ
∗
i ))Li, is exactly satisfied.
Average income, the proportion of human capital employed in firms oper-
ating under IRS in country i, and welfare, all of which depend on the global
profit-multiplier, can now be calculated under free trade and compared to
their corresponding value under autarky. First, the average productivity in
country i is proportional to the multiplier
yi =
wihiLi + πi
piLi
=
1
1− α−1
α
[∑
j λjTij
] Âi
α
, i = 1, 2. (16)
3We specify Gj(γ) = 1 − (γj/γ)
βj with βj > 1 and γ ≥ γj > 0, where γj is the
minimum share ownership of all domestic profit-making firms in country j. Note that∫
∞
γ
j
γdGj(γ) = 1/Lj which implies γj = (βj − 1)/βjLj , so we have:
Tij = Li
∫ γ∗ij
γ
j
γdGj(γ) = 1−
(
βj − 1
βjLjγ
∗
ij
)βj−1
, i, j = 1, 2.
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Secondly, in addition to the variety of goods produced under conditions
of increasing returns (q∗i ), MSV suggest preferring an alternative measure
of industrialization, namely, the proportion of human capital employed in
country i firms with access to IRS technology (hIRSi /hiLi). If we omit the
human capital required to start production (FA−1i q
∗
i ), it is equal to
hIRSi
hiLi
=
λi
h¯iAi
∑
j
(
γ∗ijN
∗
ij + Tij
)((wjhjLj + πj)
piLi
)
, i = 1, 2. (17)
Finally, given Eqs. (1), (4), and (8), the average welfare across each
income class γ of households living in country j is given by
V
γ
j =
∑
i
(
(1 + qγij)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
∫ 1
1−λi
mδidmi
)
, j = 1, 2, and dm2 = −dm1,
(18)
with qγij = γ(wjhjLj + πj)/pi.
Let us consider two identical countries. From Eqs. (9) and (15), there is
a unique solution: λ1 = λ2 = 1/2 and γ
∗
11 = γ
∗
12 = γ
∗
22 = γ
∗
21, ∀ δ. In country
j, using Eq. (18), we obtain[∫ 1/2
0
(1−mj)
δdmj +
∫ 1
1/2
(mj)
δdmj
]
−
∫ 1
0
(mj)
δdmj > 0, j = 1, 2.
Hence, trade between two symmetric countries implies positive welfare
gains from variety for both trade partners.
4 Comparative statics
4.1 Differences in income distribution
In this section, countries 1 and 2 differ only by their distribution of share
ownership and human capital endowments Gj(γ), i.e., labor efficiency is the
same (Â1 = Â2) and labor force is the same (L1 = L2). Country 1 (2) is
characterized by a more (less) equal income distribution (β1 > β2). The
equilibria under autarky and free trade are illustrated in Figure 1, where the
lower left-hand quadrant depicts (1−Gj(γ))Lj together with the break even
conditions, and the upper right-hand quadrant displays the corresponding
Lorenz curve.
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Pareto 1
Pareto 2
T1
T2
γ1* γ2*
T21=T11
T12=T22
γ11*
γ22*γ
(1-Gj(γ))Lj
Gj(γ)
L(Gj(γ))
Lorenz 2
Lorenz 1
45°
1-N12*/L21-N11*/L1
Figure 1: Equilibrium under autarky and free trade with differences in inequality.
In the no-trade equilibrium, the more equal trade partner is characterized
by a larger mass of households who are able to contribute to the domestic
profit-multiplier. As shown in Figure 1, the break even conditions yield
N∗1 = N
∗
2 which implies T1 > T2. Therefore, the profit-multiplier is higher in
country 1 which leads ceteris paribus to both a higher average productivity
and a greater proportion of human capital employed in firms with access to
IRS technologies. These differences across countries simply reflect the obser-
vation by MSV: a large middle class encourages mass production because it
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boosts the cumulative processes4.
The exposure of domestic industries to foreign competition modifies the
customer base in each sector. Because labor efficiency and the size of the
labor force are identical across countries, real wages are equalized under free
trade. The simultaneous solution to Eqs. (9), (14) and (15) is λ1 = λ2 = 1/2.
Using Eqs. (9) and (14), it is then easily verified that the integrated world
equilibrium also satisfies γ∗11 = γ
∗
12 = γ
∗
21 = γ
∗
22 whatever γ
∗
1  γ∗2. There
are no longer two income distributions, but one global distribution of income
where each type-γ class of household spends its income equally on countries
1 and 2 products.
What are the effects of trade on country 1’s profit-multiplier? First,
using (9), and given that N∗1 = N
∗
2 under autarky, we have |N
∗
11 −N
∗
1 | =
|N∗12 −N
∗
1 |. Secondly, recall that the Lorenz curve is convex, and its slope in
Gj(γ) is equal to γLj. This allows us to conclude for country 1:
γ∗1  γ
∗
2 ⇒ γ
∗
11 ⋚ γ
∗
1
⇒ T1  T11, N11  N1, and T22 = T12  T2
⇒
|T1 − T11|
|N∗11 −N
∗
1 |
 γ∗11 = γ
∗
12 
|T12 − T2|
|N∗2 −N
∗
12|
⇒ T11 + T12 < T1 + T2 ⇒
1
2
(T11 + T12) < T1.
Trade shifts country 1’s middle class demand away from goods produced
in country 1, which weakens its multiplier. Country 1 thus sees the shrink-
ing of those markets where increasing returns to scale are strongest under
autarky, thereby lowering human capital employed in country 1 firms op-
erating under IRS. Even though the upper class is larger in country 2, it
mainly contributes to increasing the demand for goods with the highest in-
come elasticities of demand produced in country 1. Since most of them are
produced with the CRS technology, their increased output cannot outweigh
the decrease in the average productivity in country 1.
The opposite occurs in country 2, thanks to the mass middle class in
country 1 which contributes to enlarging the market share of goods produced
4Note that the alternative case where (1−G1(γ))L1 crosses (1−G2(γ))L2 somewhere
above F/(α−1), implies γ∗
1
< γ∗
2
and, therefore, q∗
1
may be smaller than q∗
2
despite country
1 being more equal than country 2. Nevertheless, whatever γ∗
1
 γ∗
2
, we still have T1 > T2,
y
1
> y
2
, and hIRS
1
/h¯1L1 > h
IRS
2
/h¯2L2.
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under conditions of increasing returns. Whatever γ∗1  γ∗2, we have
1
2
(T22 + T21) >
1
2
(
T22 + L2
∫ γc
γ
2
γdG2(γ)
)
> T2,
where γc is defined by
∫ γc
γ
2
dG2(γ) = 1 − N
∗
11/L1. Hence, the benefits from
trade for country 2 increase with the degree of equality in the income distri-
bution in country 1.
Equations (16) and (18) are now used to solve the output and welfare
levels of the two income classes. As long as Â1 = Â2 and L1 = L2, the world
market shares of home and foreign products and the preference parameter
m of the marginal household which is indifferent between the home and the
foreign variety, are equal to 1/2.
In country 2, all households can purchase a larger range of goods in the
trade equilibrium. Moreover, each household can pick its ideal variety of any
good q which means a complementary source of positive gains from trade
for half of them. Hence, all households favor trade independently of their
relative standing on the domestic income scale and of their preference for
domestic versus foreign goods.
In country 1, all households now consume a smaller range of goods. Both
varieties of each good q are offered at the same price, so for households which
rate domestic goods higher than foreign goods, product variety is not a source
of gains from trade. Free trade is welfare-reducing for these households.
Those which prefer foreign products may not all be compensated by variety
gains. In the light of (18), whatever the value of γ, the household which is
indifferent between the domestic and the foreign variety, i.e., m1 = m2 =
1/2, differs from the marginal household which prefers trade. Even though
the mass of households is equally split between households which buy the
domestic good and those which prefer the corresponding foreign substitute,
less than half of them favor trade. More specifically, the higher the relative
price sensitivity of demand (δ), the more the gains from variety outweigh the
losses in the range of goods they can purchase under free trade.
4.2 Differences in labor efficiency
Now we discuss the relationship between international demand spillovers and
the growth (or decline) of industrial activities in economies that differ only by
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their labor efficiency. In this section, country 1 has a technological advantage
in producing all goods: Â1 > Â2. In autarky, each household in country 1
has a higher purchasing power which originates from higher labor efficiency
and not from a larger domestic profit-multiplier. Hence, in terms of human
capital employed in firms where IRS technology is implemented, country 1
does better than country 2.
When autarky ends and free trade begins, the more the labor force in
country 1 is efficient in producing goods, the more competitive are firms
located in country 1. The trade equilibrium is obtained when excess demand
in the two countries is equal and opposite. Figure 2 (right-hand quadrant)
illustrates the simultaneous solution to Eqs. (9), (14), and (15). When both
trade partners share the same Pareto income distribution, i.e., β1 = β2, using
Eq. (14) and substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (15) yields
Â1
Â2
= Ψ(λ1) =
(
λ1
1− λ1
)1+δ 1
α
+ α−1
α
(
F
α−1
)β−1
β (φ1(λ1))
1
β
1
α
+ α−1
α
(
F
α−1
)β−1
β (φ2(1− λ1))
1
β
L2
L1
, (19)
where we used
∑
j λjTij = 1 − (F/(α − 1))
(β−1)/βφi(λi)
1/β, with φ1(λi) =
λiL
1−β
1 +(1−λi)
βλ1−βi L
1−β
2 , φ2(λi) = λiL
1−β
2 +(1−λi)
βλ1−βi L
1−β
1 , φi(λi) =∞
for λi = 0, and φi(λi) = L
1−β
i for λi = Li/(Li + Lj), i 	= j. The implicit
function theorem then yields ∂λ1/∂(Â1/Â2) > 0.
As shown in the right-hand quadrant of Figure 2 where Eq. (19) is de-
picted, balanced trade requires a terms-of-trade adjustment against country
1, where the fraction of world income spent on goods produced in country
1 (λ1) increases with the widening of the technological gap (Â1/Â2). Under
free trade, the more competitive trade partner captures a larger share of the
whole range of global markets.
The left-hand quadrant of Figure 2 depicts Eq. (9) for countries 1 and 2
and the free trade equilibrium values of γ∗11 and γ
∗
22, where
γ∗ii =
β − 1
β
(
α− 1
F
)1/β
φi(λi)
1/β, i = 1, 2. (20)
First, if and only if dφi(λi)/dλi ⋚ 0, we have ∂γ∗ii/∂λi ⋚ 0. Given that
d2φi(λi)/dλ
2
i > 0, φi(λi) is therefore characterized by one minimum
5. Second,
5As illustrated in the left-hand quadrant of Figure 2, φ
1
(λ1) and φ2(λ1) must cross
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the type of the marginal household in the no-trade equilibrium is given by
γ∗i =
β − 1
β
(
α− 1
F
)1/β
L
(1−β)/β
i , i = 1, 2, (21)
which allows us to conclude
λi ⋚
Li
Li + Lj
⇔ φi(λi)  L
1−β
i ⇔ γ
∗
ii  γ
∗
i , i, j = 1, 2 and i 	= j. (22)
γ Â1/Â21
1/2
λ1=1-λ2
γ11*
δ
γ2*
Market clearing (Ψ(λ1))
γ1*
γ22*
(Â1/Â2)Th
φ1(λ1)
φ2(λ1)
argmin φ1(λ1)
Figure 2: International equilibrium with differences in labor efficiency.
We are now ready to derive the consequences of a move from autarky
to free trade when Â1 > Â2: markets clear with λ1 > L1/(L1 + L2) which
implies γ∗11 < γ
∗
1 and γ
∗
22 > γ
∗
2. This yields an increase (decrease) in country 1
(2)’s multiplier6. Global demand complementarities exacerbate international
disparities. In terms of average income, trade penalizes the economy with the
each other in λ1 = λ2 = 1/2. Moreover, using Eq. (20), it is easy to check that when
L2/L1 = 1, we have
argmin(φ
1
(λ1)) > 1/2 > argmin(φ2(λ1)) .
6Replacing Eqs. (20) and (21) in their profit-multiplier’s definition under respectively
free trade and autarky, we obtain similar functions Mi(γ), where ∂Mi(γ)/∂γ < 0, for
either γ∗i or γ
∗
ii.
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less efficient labor force and favors the technically more advanced country.
Overall, the opening to trade raises the proportion of the labor force em-
ployed by firms with access to IRS technology in the advanced economy. It
shrinks in the backward country even though the deterioration in the latter
is not uniform across industries. Some are affected negatively while others
are affected positively. In fact, labor market clearing in country 2 leads the
variety of goods produced under IRS (q∗2) to rise, allowing firms which pro-
duce goods with relatively higher income elasticities of demand to benefit
from country 1’s middle-class buying power.
More to the point, the customer base of more competitive country 1 firms
operating under IRS expands in the area of goods with low income elastic-
ities of demand. A large proportion of households in country 2 contributes
to boosting the production of low-indexed goods produced in country 1,
strengthening IRS in these industries. This is at the expense of their less
competitive counterparts in country 2. Note that the proportion of domes-
tic income which may potentially buy goods produced in country 1 using
IRS technologies is indeed greater in country 2 than in country 1. We have
γ∗12 > γ
∗
1 > γ
∗
11, where type-γ
∗
12 households in country 2 have a purchasing
power similar to that of type-γ∗11 households in country 1. Hence, there is
a proportion λ1 of L2G2(γ
∗
12) and L1G1(γ
∗
11), where L2G2(γ
∗
12) > L1G1(γ
∗
11),
which contributes to increasing profits in country 1 firms operating under
IRS. If the type-γ∗12 household is rich by country 2 standards, its spending
pattern is similar to that of the middle class in country 1. Thus, country 1
producers of goods with the lowest income elasticities of demand produce at
a more efficient scale and earn higher profits. The same reasoning applies to
explain why there is a contraction of rival industries’ activity in country 2.
We have γ∗21 < γ
∗
2 < γ
∗
22 which yields T21 < T22. Therefore, there is only a
proportion λ2 < 1/2 of L1G1(γ
∗
21), where γ
∗
21 < γ
∗
11, and L2G2(γ
∗
22), where
γ∗22 < γ
∗
12, which contributes to profits made by country 2 firms using IRS
technologies.
Our model thus identifies a demand-side channel through which trade
integration contributes to the gap for countries lagging behind the techno-
logical frontier. In country 2 which is less productive, free trade introduces
more competitive foreign industries generating the infant industry argument
for protection. It was sometimes used in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s and in
India for most of the second half of the twentieth century to pursue import-
substitution policies relying on enormous domestic market to modernize their
respective industries. Whereas, South Korea industrialized in the 1960s and
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1970s by committing to an export-led growth strategy to compensate for its
limited domestic demand7. Both strategies have in common to utilize fixing
of prices instead of letting them adjust to the free play of market forces (see
Ray 1998).
Finally, we heuristically discuss welfare gains from trade. First, the terms
of trade adjustment and parameter δ determine the proportion of world de-
mand addressed to each sector and, therefore, the growth or decline of aver-
age productivity when countries engage in free trade. Secondly, according to
their preferences and relative price, households may choose their ideal vari-
ety produced either at home or abroad. In country 1, average productivity
increases. Since more than half the households buy domestic varieties, a
majority gains from trade. To this proportion λ1 > 1/2, one must add a
positive proportion of the remaining households for which gains from variety
more than outweigh the loss of purchasing power incurred by the higher rela-
tive price of the imported variety. In contrast, average productivity decreases
in country 2. This loss is only partially offset by the gains from variety and
by access to cheaper goods from abroad.
4.3 Differences in labor force size
We turn to the analysis of the impact of trade on economies which differ only
in the size of their labor force. Let country 2 be the larger country (L2 > L1).
Because IRS in autarky depend only on the domestic market size, they are
stronger in country 2. For all goods q produced under IRS, the unit costs are
lower in Country 2 where each industry produces a greater quantity than its
foreign counterpart (Dq2 = L2(1−G2(γ
q
2)) > D
q
1 = L1(1−G1(γ
q
1)), ∀q). Now
we question whether free trade is a good thing for each country or only for
one of them? In which case, is it the small or the large country that loses
from trade?
7In the words of Irwin (2008): “The [infant industry] argument holds that certain new
industries should be protected from foreign competition in the expectation that they will
eventually mature and successfully compete against more experienced foreign rivals... In
the modern literature, [it] hinges on ‘dynamic learning effects’, which allow an industry
that is not currently competitive to become so after a temporary period of protection.”
In a recent paper, Melitz (2005) shows that how and when infant industries should be
protected depends on the industry’s learning potential, the speed of learning, and the
degree of substitutability between the domestic and foreign goods. In view of the static
nature of our model, it lies beyond its scope to discuss this issue further.
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Suppose there is an equal share of world income devoted to goods pro-
duced in each country, then there will be excess labor demand in country 1
requiring a terms of trade adjustment. To guarantee labor-market equilib-
rium in both trade partners, the proportion of households which consume
country 1 goods (λ1) must be less than 1/2. Interesting enough, λ1 remains
greater than L1/(L1+L2) as long as the relative price sensitivity of demand is
sufficiently low8. Let country 1 import relatively cheaper varieties from coun-
try 2 in a proportion 1− λ1 with λ1 = L1/(L1 + L2). For those households
in country 1 which buy country 2 goods, this implies purchasing power gains
which allow them to increase the range of goods they can import. Excess la-
bor demand in country 2 results, which leads to an improvement in its terms
of trade. Eventually, λ1 rises above L1/(L1+L2) which implies γ
∗
11 < γ
∗
1 (see
Eq. (22)). Hence, country 1’s multiplier rises by opening to trade while the
opposite holds true in country 2 where λ2 < L2/(L1 + L2) which implies a
decrease in country 2’s multiplier. International demand complementarities
benefit the small economy at the expense of the larger trade partner.
The intuition as to why country 1 multiplier rises is that the trade-induced
enlargement of demand for the small country’s firms is biased towards those
operating under IRS, thanks to the large number of country 2’s relatively
poor households in the world distribution of income. Given Eq. (14), γ-
income classes of households with similar purchasing power in terms of goods
produced in country 1 (2), are such that γ∗11 > γ
∗
12 (γ
∗
22 < γ
∗
21). Since
average productivity is greater in country 2 and using Eq. (20), this implies
γ∗21 > γ
∗
11 > γ
∗
22 > γ
∗
12. If the type-γ
∗
12 household is relatively poor by country
2 standards, it is middle class by country 1 standards. With L1 < L2 and
λ1 > L1/(L1 + L2), demand for goods produced by country 1 firms using
IRS technologies is therefore higher under free trade, increasing profits. The
counterpart in country 2 is a fall in IRS production activities at the aggregate
level.
To sum up, the small country narrows the range of its domestic IRS
industrial activities to concentrate more productively on fewer high-priority
product niches, whereas in the large country, the range of industries operating
8Recall that Ψ(λ1) is monotonically increasing with λ1. Then, for L1/L2 < 1, Â1/Â2 =
1, and δ > (β − 1)/β, Equation (19) implies
Ψ
(
L1
L1 + L2
)
< Ψ(λ1) = 1⇒ λ1 >
L1
L1 + L2
.
22
under IRS increases.
It is not entirely surprising that our results contrast with those in Ethier
(1982) where the large country specializes in the IRS sector and always gains
from trade whereas the small country may lose if it is not too small rela-
tive to its trade partner and IRS are sufficiently weak. Our settings differ
markedly: trade in two homogeneous versus many differentiated goods, and
external versus internal increasing returns. However, as long as Â1 = Â2
and L1 < L2, we can stress that if country 2 in our framework is tempted
by protection, the latter should be considered on a permanent basis which
is the Graham’s (1923) case for protection as discussed in Ethier (1982), not
the infant industry argument for protection as discussed above.
5 Technological catch-up and convergence
We now trace out the consequences of a technically backward partner (coun-
try 2) narrowing its technological gap under the free trade regime. Suppose
that Â1 > Â2, L1 = L2, and β1 = β2. An increase in Â2 requires a fall in
the relative price of country 2 goods to keep trade between the two countries
in balance. It eventually translates into an increase in the range of goods
the expanding global middle class can purchase: λ1 and γ
∗
22 unambiguously
decrease (see Figure 2) which implies a higher global profit-multiplier. Effi-
ciency gains in country 2 allow its industries to sustain the rising demand for
all the goods they produce. The larger customer base has two sources: (i) a
larger share of world markets caused by the increase in λ2, (ii) a larger world
market due not only to country 2’s labor productivity increase, but also to
magnified international demand complementarities which raise international
demand.
There is an ambiguous impact of technological catch-up on the technically
more advanced trade partner, depending on whether the initial technologi-
cal gap starts above or below some threshold ((Â1/Â2)Th). Suppose that
Â1/Â2 < (Â1/Â2)Th as depicted in Figure 2. Gains in factor efficiency in
the lagging trade partner lead the global profit-multiplier in the advanced
country to fall (γ∗11 increases and ∂M1/∂γ
∗
11 < 0) while the opposite occurs
if Â1/Â2 starts above (Â1/Â2)Th.
What is the intuition behind this ambiguous impact? Before technolog-
ical catch-up, world demand for country 1 products is divided into three
categories: (i) a range of goods with the lowest income elasticities of demand
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(0, q) that all households from both trade partners are able to purchase, (ii)
an intermediate range of goods (q, q) which is acquired by all country 1 house-
holds and a smaller proportion of country 2 households, (iii) a range of goods
with higher income elasticities of demand that only rich enough households
from either trade partner can purchase. As far as the first range of goods
is concerned, the world demand for country 1 products falls as a result of
the decrease in λ1. The net impact on the second and third categories of
an increase in Â2 depends on the extent of two effects which shift demand
for these products in opposite directions: the decrease in the share of world
income spent on goods produced by country 1 firms, and the increase in the
purchasing power of the global middle class by country 1 standards.
Figure 2 displays the case where Â1/Â2 is below (Â1/Â2)Th. In country
1, the loss of competitiveness mostly harms producers of goods with low in-
come elasticities of demand. Aggregate profits fall because country 1 IRS
firms producing goods with lower income elasticities of demand now produce
at a less efficient scale. However, the rise in average productivity in country
2 spills over to country 1 sectors producing goods with higher income elastic-
ities of demand. If the relative share of IRS firms’ production in total output
decreases, there is an increase in the range of country 1 firms that are able to
implement IRS technologies. Indeed, the rising demand from the emerging
global middle class which accompanies technological catch-up in country 2
spurs demand for goods with high income elasticities of demand.
In contrast to the Ricardian model with non-homothetic preferences in
Matsuyama (2000), a scenario of immiserizing growth in country 2 is impos-
sible here. In his framework, country 2 specializes in goods with low income
elasticities whose demand does not increase in response to the fall in prices.
Thus, it may lose from its terms of trade deterioration associated with a
labor productivity improvement. In fact, the relatively cheaper goods im-
ported from country 2 only provide the opportunity for rich households in
country 1 to expand their consumption of goods with high income elasticity
of demand that are only produced in country 1. In the present model, our
preference assumptions together with international imperfect competition do
not imply complete geographic specialization. Depending on δ and the terms
of trade adjustments, technical catch-up enables the lagging trade partner to
expand its scale of output and attain markup opportunities which are ruled
out in a Ricardian analysis. Country 2 cannot lose from its productivity
improvement, while its trade partner may either win or lose depending on
the initial technological gap.
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Finally, suppose that country 1 is not only more productive (Â1 > Â2) but
also smaller than country 2 (L1 < L2). Under autarky, the large emerging
country benefits from a higher multiplier thanks to its population’ size, while
the small industrialized country has a higher income per capita because of its
more efficient labor force. What is the impact of trade on countries 1 and 2’s
aggregates when β1 is still assumed to be equal to β2
9? Comparative statics
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 show that country 1 (country 2) must see its multiplier
increase (shrink) while it moves from autarky to free trade, thereby raising
(lowering) its average real income.
Consider now the effect of an increase in labor efficiency in country 2.
First, terms of trade deteriorate in country 2. Secondly, recall that the Gini
coefficient of the Pareto distribution is defined to be 1/(2β−1). Interestingly
enough, using Eq. (20), we obtain10:
L2
L1
> (2β − 1)1/(β−1) ⇒ argmin(φ1(λ1)) < 1/2 and argmin(φ2(λ1)) < 1/2.
This allows us to conclude that as long as Â1/Â2 > (Â1/Â2)Th and L2/L1 >
(2β−1)1/(β−1), Eq. (20) is increasing where λ1 clears markets, implying lower
γ∗11 and γ
∗
22. Technological catch-up in the large emerging country therefore
yields an increase in both country 1 and country 2’s global profit-multipliers
and average real incomes. Moreover, convergence occurs with y1/y2 falling
relative to the above free trade baseline.
6 Conclusion
The literature on international trade and development has concentrated on
international technology spillovers, but neglected international demand spillovers.
Our contribution seeks to fill the gap. It presents a multi-industry and two-
country general equilibrium model in which demand spillovers contribute
to propagate increasing returns to scale both across industries and national
boundaries. We relax the traditional assumption of homothetic preferences
to focus on the role played by the global income distribution, both in the
9Based on the World Income Inequality data base, Mukhopadhaya (2004) classifies
China and the US in the same group of countries where the group includes countries with
Gini coefficients between 0.40 and 0.45.
10The Penn World Tables (see Heston et al. 2006) indicate that China was about four
times more populous than the United States in 2004.
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international structure of production and in the trade pattern between coun-
tries that differ in size. Despite the difficulty of testing some of the ideas
presented above, empirical work is now needed to assess the importance of
international demand spillovers at both aggregate and sectoral levels.
Our results raise additional questions which could profitably be addressed
in the future. First, one implication of our model is that income transfers
have very different effects depending on whether they are between or within
countries or if they occur within a leader or a follower economy. Let us
consider a policy that would promote a more equal distribution in country i
of an amount τ (wihiLi+πi)/Li among all households in country i, where τ is
the marginal tax rate. Let γτ = (1−τ )γ+τ/Li denote the associated post tax
ownership share of a type-γ household. The redistribution eventually exerts
a positive effect on the adoption of IRS technology in both trade partners,
therefore demonstrating the potential benefits of reducing both across- and
within-country inequalities.
Secondly, our contribution focuses on the dichotomy between autarky
and free trade. Endogenous growth models with either variety-expanding or
quality-upgrading of products, which introduce differing income elasticities of
demand for different goods, have recently emerged in the literature. For ex-
ample, Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) examine the impact of non-homothetic
preferences and therefore inequality on innovation and consequent economic
growth. Solow (2005) expresses some surprise at the lack of attention to
the interaction of demand-side and supply-side variations, i.e., to economics
of the medium run, within multi-industry and multi-country growth frame-
works. These interactions remain a valuable, open, and empirically relevant
issue to be addressed.
7 Appendix: International price equilibrium
When entering the international market, the home firm with access to IRS
technology in industry q may face competition from either the rival firm
abroad with access to IRS technology or a competitive fringe of foreign firms.
This Appendix shows that the unique Nash equilibrium price strategy for a
country i monopolist entering the international market, is to set prices at
αwi/Ai provided that the world distribution of real income is smooth enough.
Proof. A country 1 monopolist entering the global marketplace cannot
set a price higher than the effective competitive price in country 1 (αw1/A1)
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without giving way to a competitive fringe of domestic firms. Hence, the
question to be solved is whether it may increase its profits by lowering its
price unilaterally below p1 = αw1/A1, i.e., while all other firms in the world
economy keep their price unchanged. For the answer to be negative, the
marginal profit should satisfy
∂πq1
∂p˜q1
=
∂D˜q1
∂p˜q1
(
p˜q1 −
w1
A1
)
+ D˜q1 > 0⇔ −
∂D˜q1
∂p˜q1
p˜q1
D˜q1
(
p˜q1 − w1/A1
p˜q1
)
< 1, (23)
with p˜q1 ≤ p1, and where D˜
q
1 is the effective demand for the variety of
good q produced in country 1 at p˜q1. In other words, the price elasticity of
demand multiplied by the price-cost margin should not exceed unity.
Using Eq. (2), if the monopolist charges p˜q1, the country 1 variety of good
q is preferred by a type-m household if
mδ1
p˜q1
(1 + q)−σ >
(1−m1)
δ
p2
(1 + q)−σ ⇔ m1 > 1− λ˜1,
with λ˜1 = p
1/δ
2 /((p˜
q
1)
1/δ + p
1/δ
2 ), and p2 = αw2/A2.
Note that p˜q1 < p1 implies λ˜1 > λ1. The monopolist’s ex post customer
base may now be divided into two categories: households of type m1 >
1 − λ1 which prefer goods produced in country 1, and households of type
1 − λ1 ≥ m1 > 1 − λ˜1 which prefer, other things being equal, product
varieties produced in country 2, except for the country 1 variety of good q.
Let us define q˜ ≤ q produced in country 1 such that
mδ1
p˜q1
(1 + q)−σ =
mδ1
p1
(1 + q˜)−σ ⇒ q˜ =
(
p1
p˜q1
)−1/σ
(1 + q)− 1.
Among the first category of households, customers for the country 1 vari-
ety of good q include all those which are rich enough to buy q˜, i.e., households
of type γ ≥ γ q˜1j, with
γ q˜1j =
(p˜q1)
1/σ(p1)
(σ−1)/σ(1 + q)− p1
wjhjLj + πj
, j = 1, 2.
Similarly, we define q̂ ≤ q produced in country 2 such that
mδ1
p˜q1
(1+ q)−σ =
(1−m1)
δ
p2
(1+ q̂)−σ ⇒ q̂ =
(
1−m1
m1
)δ/σ (
p˜q1
p2
)1/σ
(1+ q)−1.
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Among the second category of households, the country 1 monopolist in
sector q ends up with those characterized by γ ≥ γ q̂1j, where
γ q̂1j =
(
1−m1
m1
)δ/σ
(p˜q1)
1/σp
(σ−1)/σ
2 (1 + q)− p2
wjhjLj + πj
, j = 1, 2.
Therefore, the effective demand for good q produced in country 1 at price
p˜1, is
D˜q1 =
∑
j
D˜q1j ,
with D˜q1j = λ1(1−Gj(γ
q˜
1j))Lj +
∫ 1−λ1
1−λ˜1
(1−Gj(γ
q̂
1j))Ljdm1.
Let gj(γ) be the density of type-γ households in country j and βj(γ) =
gj(γ)γ/(1−Gj(γ)). The price elasticity of demand for good q can be written
as follows
−
∂D˜q1
∂p˜q1
p˜q1
D˜q1
=
∑
j
(
λ1βj(γ
q˜
1j)(1−Gj(γ
q˜
1j))Lj
σD˜q1
(
1 +
1
q˜
)
(24)
+
∫ 1−λ1
1−λ˜1
βj(γ
q̂
1j)(1−Gj(γ
q̂
1j))Lj
σD˜q1
(
1 +
1
q̂
)
dm1
+
λ˜1(1− λ˜1)(1−Gj(γ
q
2j))Lj
δD˜q1
)
.
We define βmax = max(βj(γ)), γ
−
min = min(γj
−
), and observe that M1 ≥ 1
implies q ≥ q̂ ≥ q˜ ≥ γ1
−
Â1L1/α. Equation (24) can be shown to be smaller
than
βmax
σ
1 + α
γ1
−
Â1L1
+ 1− λ1
δ
∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
2j)
)
Lj∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
1j)
)
Lj
,
which allows us to rewrite Eq. (23) asβmax
σ
1 + α
γ1
−
Â1L1
+ 1− λ1
δ
∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
2j)
)
Lj∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
1j)
)
Lj
(α− 1
α
)
< 1.
(25)
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In order to express Eq. (25) as a function of the set of parameters which
govern the world distribution of real income, we need to specify Gj(γ). We
define Gj(γ) to be the Pareto distribution which has the following useful
properties: βj (γ) = βj, ∀γ, and γj
−
=
(
βj − 1
)
/
(
βjLj
)
. First, we can show
that ∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
2j)
)
Lj∑
j
(
1−Gj(γ
q
1j)
)
Lj
≤
(
1− λ1
λ1
)δβmax
. (26)
Secondly, given that α ≥Mj ≥ 1, Eq. (15) implies
1− λ1
λ1
≤
(
αÂ2L2
Â1L1
) 1
1+δ
. (27)
Using Eqs. (25), (26), and (27), the following inequality provides a suffi-
cient condition for ruling out price-cutting equilibria:βmaxσ
(
1 +
β1α
(β1 − 1) Â1
)
+
1
δ
(
αÂ2L2
Â1L1
) 1+δβmax
1+δ
1 +
(
αÂ2L2
Â1L1
) 1
1+δ
(α− 1α
)
< 1. (28)
As long as Eq. (23) is satisfied, when a firm in country 1 with access to
IRS technology in industry q aims to cut the price below αw1/A1, it is not
able to expand its customer base to such an extent as to compensate the
loss in the rate of profit per customer, thus discouraging price-cutting. In
our framework, such condition results in Eq. (28). Neither the domestic nor
the world income distribution should degenerate around any type-γ, together
with σ and δ being sufficiently above unity, for price-cutting to be ruled out.
A similar sufficient condition applies to firms in country 2 with access to IRS
technology.
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